Software
resevol: Simulate Agricultural Production and Evolution of Pesticide Resistance
The resevol
package simulates individual-based models of agricultural pest
management and the evolution of pesticide resistance. Management occurs
on a spatially explicit landscape that is divided into an arbitrary
number of farms that can grow one of up to 10 crops and apply one of up
to 10 pesticides. Pest genomes are modelled in a way that allows for any
number of pest traits with an arbitrary covariance structure that is
constructed using an evolutionary algorithm in the
mine_gmatrix() function. Simulations are then run using the
run_farm_sim() function. This package thereby allows for
highly mechanistic social-ecological models of the evolution of
pesticide resistance under different types of crop rotation and
pesticide application regimes.
Installation instructions for resevol are available on GitHub. The resevol package is available on CRAN with documentation for use.
GMSE: An R package for Generalised Management Strategy Evaluation
The GMSE package
integrates game theory and ecological theory to construct
social-ecological models that simulate the management of populations and
stakeholder actions. These models build off of a previously developed
management strategy evaluation (MSE) framework to simulate all aspects
of management: population dynamics, manager observation of populations,
manager decision making, and stakeholder responses to management
decisions. The newly developed generalised management strategy
evaluation (GMSE) framework uses genetic algorithms to mimic the
decision-making process of managers and stakeholders under conditions of
change, uncertainty, and conflict. All simulations can be run using the
gmse() function.
Installation instructions for GMSE are available on GitHub. GMSE is available on CRAN with documentation for use. A limited version of the software can also be run directly from a browser.
gamesGA: An R package to find adaptive game strategies
The gamesGA R package finds adaptive strategies for games characterised by any 2 × 2 symmetrical payoff matrix played over multiple rounds between two players. Players can therefore play one of two choices in each round against their opponent, and can base their choice on the previous three rounds of their opponent’s play. Consequently, strategies can evolve to maximise payoffs that respond to an opponent’s history of cooperation or defection, as occurs in the classic game of Prisoner’s dilemma.
Installation instructions for gamesGA are available on GitHub. The gamesGA pacakge is also available on CRAN, with documentation for use. Alternatively, the software can be run directly from a browser.